The Impact of World Recession and World Prices on a Sample of Developing Countries by Harvey, Charles




This article is based on a recently completed studyt of
changes in the global economy and their impact on a
sample of li countries. There were 10 developing
countries in the sample - Argentina, Brazil, Jordan,
Korea, Kuwait, Malawi, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Tunisia
and Venezuela - and one peripheral European
country, Ireland. The countries were chosen to include
net exporters and importers of oil, manufactured
goods and food, and to include a spread of income
levels and location. Not all of the conclusions of the
study can be summarised here; this paper concentrates
on the post-1979 recession, its impact on the sample
countries' development and rates of inflation, and the
success of their policies, in so far as success can be
addressed.2
The first point to stress is that the post-1979 recession
was very much more severe, and went on for much
longer, than the post-1973 recession. This was in large
part because of the different reactions after 1979 of the
OECD governments.3 In 1974 there was considerable
collective concern to avoid global deflation, and
positive action was taken, for example large increases
in the flow of aid and the creation of new lending
facilities at the IMF.
There was nothing comparable after 1979. On the
contrary, the overriding concern to control inflation,
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2 in this short paper, the point that countries and their governments
are not identical is neglected, as is the point that governments are
not monolithic nor representative of all groups of people in a
country.
The World Bank gives two proximate causes of the post-1979
recession: the 1979 oil price rise and the disinflationary policies of
the governments of most major industrial countries after 1980, but
adds that there was an underlying long term deterioration in the
economic performance of industrial countries (World Development
Report. 1984: Il-12).
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and the method chosen (reduced monetary growth)
tended to deepen and lengthen the recession. There
was an almost complete neglect of the effect of OECD
policies on developing countries. The only significant
exception was when the financial system was
threatened by the prospect of default by large
borrowers from Western banks.
Meanwhile, as is detailed below, developing countries
did nol share in the one benefit of the prolonged
recession: in general inflation did not fall in
developing countries, and where it did fall it was not
reduced to anywhere near the low levels of the major
OECD economies, still less the fall in the level of
import prices.
The effect on developing countries of the post-1979
recession was made much worse because so many
governments expected it to be short, as had been the
case in the post-1973 period. This expectation was
enhanced by the repeated forecasts of official bodies
- including the OECD. the IMF and the World Bank
- that the world economy would soon recover.
Whatever the reason, many developing country
governments ran down their reserves and raptdly
increased their short term foreign debt. These policies
might have been the right ones if the world economy
had indeed recovered quickly. But they were extremely
damaging in the event; and the effects were worsened
by the very large increase in real international interest
rates, from having been mainly negative to the highest
levels seen since 1945.
As a result, a wide range of developing countries were
in deep financial and economic trouble in the early
1980s, including some of those exporting (or self-
sufficient in) oil or food, and including those which
had followed a wide range of different policies.
Judgements as to whether particular categories of
country or of policy were 'successful' or not had
therefore to be more subjective than if the
international economy had not inflicted a degree of
failure on both the 'successful' and the 'unsuccessful'.
Impact on Output and Debt
With the exception of Kuwait, all the countries in the
sample maintained growth of output in the period
1973-75. Malawi, and to a lesser extent Ireland,
faltered somewhat, but both recovered in the 1975-79
period. Indeed, in the four years after the 1975
recession, real output in all the countries except
Argentina grew rapidly. After 1979, country after
country ran into srious trouble. Some managed to
maintain output growth for longer than others, but
that was not necessarily an advantage if it depended on
unsustainable short term borrowing and resulted in a
more disruptive crisis at a later date.
Falls in output were not the only indicators of crisis.
Of the sample countries, Argentina, Brazil, Malawi
and Venezuela had to reschedule their external debts,
and the first three had to submit to IMF-imposed
cutbacks in demand as well. In Malawi this occurred
despite a falling real wage in the l970s and early 1980s.
Tanzania was in such a serious state that any
reasonable projection of export earnings and resource
transfers pointed to a continuing decline. Sri Lanka
cut back on much of its welfare system; and even
Tunisia, a net oil exporter, having been able to
maintain growth in 1980 and 1981, was in some
financial difficulty by 1983.
Only Ireland, Korea, Kuwait and Jordan were not in
immediate trouble by the end of 1983. Ireland was able
to increase official external debt to over 50 per cent of
GDP without becoming less creditworthy, helped no
doubt by its status as a developed industrial country
(and despite being the poorest in this category).
Ireland was also helped by having access to the EEC
market, while other industrialising countries faced
increased protection (to Ireland's advantage).
Kuwait had such a high income, from oil and from the
foreign investment of past surpluses, that its economy
was able to ride out comfortably the fluctuations so far
occurring in the world economy. And Jordan was so
closely linked to the income of nearby oil exporters,
through aid and migrant workers' remittances, as to
be relatively immune to the effects of the world
recession.
lt is rather more difficult to explain why Korea was
able to resume growth after only one year in which
output fell, and to sustain its ability to obtain loans
from international banks, in contrast to Brazil for
example. Both countries had exceptionally rapid
growth of export earnings, and maintained similar
ratios of foreign exchange reserves to imports,
between 1978 and 1981. Although Brazil financed a
higher proportion of imports with foreign loans in this
period, Korea financed more of its investment with
foreign borrowing.
The explanation of Brazil's financial crisis must lie
partly in the sheer size of the country's external debt
and debt service ratio ($90 bn and 86 per cent
respectively in 1982), partly in the greater external
shocks suffered from falling terms of trade and rising
international interest rates, and maybe partly also
because Brazil was regarded by the international
banks as part of the Latin American debt problem
when Mexico defaulted in 1982. Korea, on the other
hand, managed to reduce its debt service ratio (and its
ratio of total external debt to exports), and suffered a
much smaller external shock - partly because Korea
is an importer of commodities and gained instead of
losing from the fall in commodity prices in the early
1980s.
Both Korea and Brazil chose a high risk strategy,
based on large scale foreign borrowing invested in
rapid growth; it would seem that Brazil took the
higher risks and then suffered the greater external
shocks. Nevertheless, even for Brazil the strategy
yielded two decades of five per cent growth in income
per head.
Access to Oil Exporters' Income
An important feature of adjustment for oil importing
countries was their ability to take advantage of the
new opportunities created in the oil exporting
countries by the large shift of income in their favour.
Ways of earning additional income from oil exporters
included exporting to them, bidding for construction
contracts in them, sending migrant workers to them,
and receiving OPEC aid. Some countries also
borrowed from international banks, whose resources
included some of the unspent balances of the oil
exporters. The only countries in the sample which did
not benefit significantly from any of these sources
were Malawi and Tanzania.
Brazil and Korea were the only countries in the group
to respond on a large scale to the increased demand
from oil exporters for manufactured goods, and in
particular for capital goods. Korea's exports of heavy
manufactures (to all countries) increased from 14 per
cent to 43 per cent of total merchandise exports
between 1971 and 1981, SC) that Korea was able to take
full advantage of the new situation: Korean exports to
oil exporting countries rose by 230 per cent from 1978
to 1981, compared with 126 per cent for total Korean
exports. Korea was also the only country in the sample
to benefit from the construction boom in oil exporting
countries: receipts from overseas constructionjumped
from $39 mn in 1975 to $2,148 mn in 1978.
The structure of Brazil's exports did not change quite
so fast - the share of transport and machinery
equipment rose from almost nothing in 1960 to 17 per
25
cent in 1980 but nevertheless Brazil's exports to oil
exporters also increased by over 200 per cent from
1977 to 1981, compared with a 92 per cent rise in total
Brazilian exports.
The contrast with other countries in the sample was
very marked. The share of exports from Argentina and
Sri Lanka going to oil exporters actually went down
from 1977 to 1981. Jordan continued to sell a high
proportion of exports to oil exporters, but merchandise
exports were a fairly minor source of foreign exchange
compared to aid and remittances. Ireland and Tunisia
(itself a net oil exporter) increased their sales to oil
exporters, but not by significant amounts. Venezuela,
as a major oil exporter, did not have the same urgent
need to sell to other oil exporters. But as a middle
income country it could have used the chance of
diversifying its economy. It failed to do so, exports to
oil exporters being insignificant throughout (0.1 per
cent in 1977 and 0.2 per cent in 1980).
Jordan, and to a much lesser extent Sri Lanka, were
the two countries in the sample to send large numbers
of migrant workers to oil exporting countries. In the
case of Jordan, migrant workers' remittances rose
from $16 mn in 1970 to $1,047 mn in 1981, and from
47 per cent to 141 per cent of earnings from
merchandise exports. Jordan obviously gained from
nearness to the Middle East oil exporters, and also
from the above average level of education of
Jordanians, so that workers were able to get jobs at
skilled as well as unskilled levels.
Sri Lanka also increased its earnings from this source,
though not on such a dramatic scale as Jordan.
Migrant workers' remittances to Sri Lanka rose from
$3 mn to $230 mn over the same period, and from
one per cent to 22 per cent of the level of merchandise
exports. Korea quadrupled its receipts from migrant
workers over the same 11 years, but, because of the
even more rapid increase in exports, remittances were
only one per cent of exports in 1981. Of the other
countries in the sample, only Tunisia and Malawi sent
many migrant workers to other countries, but
Tunisians went mainly to France and Malawians
mainly to South Africa.
Jordan was also the main recipient of OPEC aid
among the sample countries. OPEC aid to Jordan was
$911 mn in 1981. very nearly as much as receipts from
migrant workers and therefore also considerably more
than earnings from exports of goods. As already
noted, Jordan depended so completely on migrant
remittances and aid from neighbouring oil exporters,
that its fortunes varied more with those of the oil
exporting countries than with those of other oil
importers. And when the oil price began to fall in the
early 1980s. Jordan lost more from reduced foreign
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exchange receipts than it gained from cheaper imports
of oil. OPEC aid to Jordan, for example, fell from
$932 mn in 1980 to $709 mn in 1982.
Tunisia (consistently) and Sri Lanka and Tanzania (at
times) also received some OPEC aid, but on a very
much smaller scale. In 1982, OPEC aid to these three
countries was in total only seven per cent of OPEC aid
to Jordan. Again, the flows diminished after 1980
(except to Tanzania because of one large project).
The major borrowers from commercial banks among
developing countries in the sample were Brazil, Korea,
Argentina and Venezuela. Jordan, Malawi, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Tunisia borrowed very little from
commercial banks, and Kuwait nothing at all. Not all
the major borrowers had a debt crisis, Korea being the
exception; and not all the minor borrowers managed
to avoid one. Malawi had to reschedule external debts,
and Tanzania ran up massive arrears of import
payments, an even less satisfactory form of debt.
Of the major borrowers, Brazil and Korea have
already been discussed; whatever the final judgement
on their chosen strategies, they borrowed in order to
invest, and in exportable products, as shown by the
rapid growth in their exports. Argentina, on the other
hand, when external commercial borrowing began on
a large scale in 1977, used the money much less
productively. It went mainly to finance a large outflow
of private capital, on the one hand, and to pay for
imports of goods competitive with Argentinian
products, on the other. Investment was low and
output stagnated, while inflation and unemployment
increased. Venezuela's foreign borrowing was not
quite so disastrous, nor was the debt crisis so difficult
to resolve as that of Argentina. Nevertheless, much of
Venezuela's foreign debt was acquired for unsustain-
able investment programmes, and at high cost and
short repayment terms, because of ineffective
regulations; furthermore, it has been estimated that, as
for Argentina, a large proportion of the foreign debt
financed private capital outflows.
Evaluation of Different Policies
As noted already, the unforeseen severity and length
of the post-1979 recession made it more difficult than
it might otherwise have been to distinguish between
successful and unsuccessful policies. Nevertheless
some points stand out sufficiently to be worth making.
Commitment to structural change
The case studies seem to show that countries
attempting structural change became much more
vulnerable to external shocks. Structural change
required new investment, sustained over a long period,
which in turn required steadily growing import
capacity. Output from the new investment tended to
be delayed - by the learning process needed for the
management of new systems, for example. More
generally, the difficulties caused by external shocks
were undoubtedly compounded by mistaken domestic
policies, but such mistakes were almost inevitable
because external shocks made management so much
more difficult.
Tanzania was caught in just such a trap after 1979,
made worse by neglect of the export sector during the
1970s. Tanzania also made strenuous efforts to protect
low income groups from the effect of adjustment, an
objective that itself made adjustment more difficult.
Structural change in Malawi was more modest. There
was a majorshift 11'ithin the agricultural sector, away
from smallholders and in favour of estates. This was
achieved by buying from smallholders at low prices
and investing much of the marketing board surplus in
estates, by forcing banks to lend to estates, and by
reducing the outflow of migrant labour so that estates
were able to increase their labour force at a declining
real wage. Nevertheless Malawi managed to survive
the post-1979 recession in considerably better shape
than Tanzania, partly at least because of the less
ambitious nature of its development strategy - and
because Malawi did not neglect (to the same extent)
the year by year need to maintain some sort of external
balance. The comparative figures for export growth
are very striking.
Table I
Annual percentage changes in export volume in
Malawi and Tanzania
Source: World Development Report, 1983
Venezuela also embarked on an ambitious series of
investments in large capital and import intensive
projects, through corporations directly financed and
controlled by the state. This strategy was based on the
expectation that foreign exchange would continue to
be plentiful for a lengthy period; yet revenues were
also committed to consumer subsidies, and to rapid
increases in imports while domestic prices were held
down. When oil revenue stagnated, the programme
was sustained by poorly managed external borrowing,
leading eventually to the need for a debt rescheduling.
There is no doubt that fluctuations in the price of oil
made economic management very difficult for
Venezuela, yet it was striking how much more
successfully Tunisia, also a net oil exporter, managed
to get through the first part of the post-1979 recession.
For example, Tunisia's GDP grew at more than 6 per
cent in 1980 and 1981, and at 1.5 per cent in 1982
(GDP in Venezuela fell slightly from 1980-82).
Although Tunisia enjoyed the benefits of rises in the
prices of both oil and other commodity exports,
earnings from both manufactured exports and
international tourism also increased enormously.
Venezuela, on the other hand, simply allowed oil to
rise from 93 per cent to 95 per cent of visible exports,
developing no other source of foreign exchange
earnings and doing less to increase food production.
It is possible that Tunisia coped more successfully with
external fluctuations because it had a level of net oil
exports which was not so large as to create a sense of
unlimited riches. The third oil exporter in the sample,
Kuwait, had such large surpluses of export earnings
(and increasingly of income from foreign investments)
as to be more or less unaffected by external
fluctuations. Venezuela, in contrast, fell somewhere in
between: rich enough as a result of oil price rises to
attempt overambitious structural change, but not rich
enough to sustain it.
Subsidies
Several of the sample countries used subsidies to
protect the population from price increases, including
those on imported goods. The case studies suggest
some generalisations:
- the prices of subsidised goods tend not to be
raised, because the blame would fall on the
government rather than on the market;
- the cost of subsidies thus becomes unmanageably
large;
- the shock of removing subsidies then becomes
increasingly impossible to contemplate, politically or
economically, because of the size of the price changes
involved.
Kuwait appeared to be an exception to these
generalisations: the cost of subsidies in Kuwait.
fluctuated rather than increasing continually. This
could be explained by the lack of political influence of
the recipients, who were to a large extent migrant
workers (60 per cent of the Kuwait population in 1981
was non-Kuwaiti).
But the cost of subsidies in Venezuela, Sri Lanka and
Tunisia, for example, did grow unmanageably large.
And attempts to cut subsidies caused major problems.
Jordan also subsidised some prices, but limited the





free prices to certain privileged groups. As in Kuwait,
lower level jobs were being done by ïmmigrants,
limiting the demand for increased subsidy, and
enabling the programme to continue.
There is much to be said in favour of subsidising the
cost of essentials for poor people, especially when, as
often occurs, other forms of redistribution are not
feasible. The problem was that the cost had a tendency
to grow to levels that could not be financed, even by
net oil exporters such as Tunisia and Venezuela.
Many of thé same arguments apply to allowing the real
exchange rate to rise, which is an attractive alternative
to subsidies because it does not require government
expenditure. As with subsidies, the longer it continues
the harder it is to change, as the gap between the
current and 'market' price widens.
Energy policies
Faced with higher oil prices, oil importers could in
principle choose between raising the domestic price of
oil and reducing demand for other imports by enough
to restore external balance, on the one hand; and
trying to increase production of exports and import
substitutes, to compensate for the increased cost of
imports, on the other hand. A crude way of measuring
the relative success of such attempts is to compare
movements in the ratio of oil imports to export
earnings. An above average increase in the ratio would
result from not forcing up the oil price, or from
adjusting by general restrictions on imports, or from
failing to increase exports or domestic energy output.
Table 2
Notes: 1960 21980 1973 'imports of energy
Sources: IFS: Centrai Bank of Ceylon: World Development Reput-t.
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Ratio of imported oil to exports
(percentages)
Sri Lanka's position was not as bad as appears in the
table. In 1981, 44 per cent of oil imports were for
re-export as refined oil products; and tourism and
migrant workers' remittances were developed as
major alternative sources of foreign exchange (48 per
cent of visible export earnings in 1982). These factors
would reduce Sri Lanka's ratio in 1982 from 54 per
cent to 24 per cent. The latter is not comparable to
other figures for 1980 in the table, because other
countries had invisible earnings, but is more or less
comparable to Sri Lanka's 1970 figure.
Brazil and Tanzania stand out as less successful by this
measure than the other sample countries. Brazil's
pattern of growth in the 1970s was very much based on
cheap energy; the only effective energy policy was the
substitution of alcohol for petrol. A new energy plan
was launched in 1979, but the measures were too
recent for any results to show up in the table.
Tanzanïa did raise the domestic price of oil, but the
share of taxation in the price declined, so that the local
price grew by less than the import price. The
government wanted to lessen the impact on low
income groups-55 per cent of imported oil was used
for public transport, and another 10 per cent for rural
lighting and urban cooking. Tanzania's poor
performance on this ratio was also caused by the
failure of exports to grow, already noted.
Net exporters of oil also had to decide, from a position
of much greater strength, whether to raise domestic oil




less than 100% increase in ratio
Argentina 18 21 17
Ireland 9 16 78
Jordan 79! 732 8
Korea 15 28 87
Malawi
more than 100% increase in ratio
Il 16 45
Brazil 12 54 350
Sri Lanka 1 2 54 350
Tanzania 9 434 378
and Venezuela chose a policy of very cheap domestic
energy. In Venezuela, the large scale, energy and
capital intensive investments encouraged by cheap
domestic energy could not be sustained, and caused
severe sectoral and macroeconomic disequilibria.
Even in Kuwait, where there was no medium term
constraint on sustaining the investment programme,
the very rapid growth of domestic energy consumption
could cause problems in the long term.
In Tunisia, petrol taxes were used to finance food
subsidies. Although this gave some elasticity to food
subsidy revenues, the programme still ran short of
cash eventually, as already noted. But there was also
an overemphasis on energy intensive investment:
energy consumption grew faster (9.2 per cent) than
GDP(8.2 per cent) or then energy production (6.0 per
cent). This was to some extent a measure of success in
raising income and in industrialisation; but it was also
of concern for the future, because it could cause
macroeconomic imbalance and because new products
could find themselves unable to compete inter-
nationally.
The Control of Imported Inflation
The phrase 'imported inflation' is usually used to
mean the increased costs of imported goods and
services, which cause domestic prices to rise (unless the
exchange rate increases to compensate). Undoubtedly
that occurred in most of the sample countries in 1973-
75 and again in 1979-81. However, the sample
countries suffered from externally induced inflation,
in the post-1979 period in particular, in other ways as
well, notably:
- global recession plus a decline in the terms of
trade can induce a country either to devalue, which
raises import prices further, or to control imports,
which reduces supply with inflationary effects;
- global recession also reduces government
revenue from import and export taxes, causing an
inflationary budget deficit;
- externally induced recession pushes up industrial
costs as capacity utilisation falls.
In addition, inflation can be transmitted from abroad
by a rise in export prices, or by easy access to external
borrowing, which increases demand for domestic
goods and services (unless it is all invested abroad).
The evidence from the sample countries suggests that
recession was a major reason for inflation continuing,
sometimes at even higher rates, after the rate of
inflation fell back in the developed industrial
countries. So the one important gain from the policies
of the developed countries, namely the reduction in
their rates of inflation, was not shared by developing
countries. This is shown quite clearly in Table 3.
In 1976-78, nearly all the 'low inflation' countries
managed to reduce their inflation rates. Malawi and
Sri Lanka even managed to get their inflation rates
down to pre-1973 levels. The only exceptions were the
two oil exporters (there were no pre-1973 figures for
Kuwait) who suffered less inflation in 1973-75,
probably because their domestic prices were not
affected directly by the oil price.
In contrast, only some countries were able to reduce
their inflation rates after 1980, and only Jordan,
Kuwait and Korea were able to get their inflation
down to or below pre-1979 levels (the decelerators).
The other sample countries all had higher inflation
after 1980 than they had had before 1979 (the
accelerators); and three countries - Ireland, Sri
Lanka and Tanzania actually had higher rates of
inflation in 198 1-82 than during the 1979-80 period of
high global inflation.
Whatever the mechanisms by which inflation was
sustained (and increased) in these countries, the fall in
global inflation after 1980 was of little benefit.
Certainly none of the sample countries, not even
Jordan and Kuwait which avoided all import controls,
was able to get down to the low inflation rates of, for
example Britain, Japan and the USA, still less to the
fall in prices of traded goods (see Table 3).
The three countries whose inflation increased after
1980 either devalued (Ireland and Tunisia, by 15 per
cent and 27 per cent against the SDR respectively) or
controlled imports very severely instead (Tanzania).
The other countries which failed to get their inflation
down to pre-1979 levels also fell into one of these
categories: Malawi devalued against the SDR by
15 per cent, while Sri Lanka and Venezuela relied on
controls.
lt is generally true that developing countries give a
lower priority to controlling inflation than to growth
and the alleviation of poverty. But the policies of the
OECD countries after 1979 made growth more
difficult, and did not even pass on their one gain, a
reduction in inflation. Nor is it possible to see, in most
cases, just how the poorer countries could have
reduced their inflation in line with the richer countries,
because of the severe balance of payments problems
created for them by the lengthy recession. No doubt
developing country policies could have been improved,
but it is hard to see how most of the sample countries
could have avoided entirely the need to devalue or
curtail imports by other means.
Conciusion
The task of developing countries, in coping with the
effects of the post-1979 recession, was made difficult,
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not just by the recession itself, but by other actions of
developed countries, including increased protectionism
and exceptionally high real interest rates. Direct
action concerning the developing countries in general,
and the poorest ones in particular, was harmful rather
than helpful - notably the American refusal to
contribute an adequate amount to the IDA
replenishment in 1984, the increasing commercial-
isation and politicisation of bilateral aid, the
inadequate increase in IMF quotas, and the failure to
increase the real value of aid.
The American Government in particular seemed to be
further than ever from taking account of Third World
interests; instead it appeared to be moving in the
Table 3
Rates of inflation 19 70-82
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opposite direction, both in its domestic economic
decisions and in its influence on such institutions as
the IMF and the World Bank, which were forced to
fight to defend even the existing levels of finance and
freedom of action available to them. One positive sign
during the 1970s was the increased share of trade
between developing countries in total world trade.
This suggested that some developing countries at least
might be able to reduce their dependence on events in
the industrial countries; but this was mainly
significant for middle income exporters of manu-
factures, and had relatively little to offer the poorer
countries. Furthermore, there were indications in the
early 1980s that this growth in the share of trade
between developing countries had been halted by the
post-1979 recession.
1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-80 198 1-82
GLOBAL AVERAGES
World export prices 6 23 7 19 -2
Import prices of oil importers 4 25 4 20 -1
Industrial country export prices
low inflation countries:
7 18 7 14 -4
accelerators
Ireland 9 16 13 11 14
Malawi 7 12 6 15 10
Sri Lanka 5 10 5 18 14
Tanzania 5 18 10 22 27
Tunisia 3 6 6 9 13
Venezuela
low inflation countries:
3 8 8 17 12
deceleratorst
Jordan 6 14 Ii 13 8
Korea 14 17 13 28 12
Kuwait
high inflation count!ies
10 8 6 8
Argentina 141 462 246 337 647
Brazil 20 23 41 41 60
Note: accelerators and decelerators defined in terms of whether inflation was higher or lower in 1981-82 than n 1976-78, see text below.
Source: International Financial Statistics, consumer price indices.
